---
domain: harmonism
tags: [harmonism, world, civilizations, saudi-arabia, arabia, wahhabism, salafism, hanbali, sufism, haramayn, petrodollar, architecture-of-harmony, civilizational-analysis]
content_layer: bridge
doctrinal_status: clear
breadth: full
depth: developed
craft: clean
published: "2026-05-17"
updated: "2026-05-19"
---
# Saudi Arabia and Harmonism

*A Harmonist reading of Saudi Arabia as civilization, organised through the [[Architecture of Harmony]]: Dharma at centre, with the eleven pillars — Ecology, Health, Kinship, Stewardship, Finance, Governance, Defense, Education, Science & Technology, Communication, Culture — serving as the structural framework for diagnosis and recovery. See also: [[Architecture of Harmony]], [[Harmonic Realism]], [[Religion and Harmonism]], [[The Five Cartographies of the Soul]], [[The Sufi Cartography of the Soul]], [[The Hollowing of the Muslim Soul]], [[Tawhid and the Architecture of the One]], [[The Spiritual Crisis]], [[Liberalism and Harmonism]], [[The Globalist Elite]], [[The Financial Architecture]].*

---

## Bilad al-Haramayn — The Land of the Two Sanctuaries

Saudi Arabia names itself, in the official Arabic, *al-Mamlaka al-ʿArabiyya al-Saʿūdiyya* — the Saudi Arab Kingdom, a state-name that encodes a specific eighteenth-century political-religious settlement projected forward as territorial sovereignty over the Arabian Peninsula. The civilizational self-naming that operates beneath the dynastic name is older and structurally weightier: *Bilād al-Ḥaramayn* — the Land of the Two Sanctuaries — and its corresponding royal title *Khādim al-Ḥaramayn al-Sharīfayn* (Servant of the Two Noble Sanctuaries), assumed by King Fahd in 1986 in deliberate displacement of the Hashemite Sharifian custodianship that preceded the 1924–1925 Saudi conquest of the Hijaz. The two sanctuaries are *Makka* and *al-Madīna*: the city of the Qurʾanic revelation, holding the *Kaʿba* toward which roughly a quarter of humanity directs ritual prayer five times daily, and the city of the Prophet's emigration, holding his mosque and burial. Custodianship of these two cities is a structural-religious responsibility distinct in kind from any contemporary political claim. Whoever holds the territory inherits the obligation; the obligation precedes any dynasty's claim to it and outlasts any dynasty's tenure.

The annual *Ḥajj* enacts the civilizational telos in continuous ritual sequence. Each year, between two and three million pilgrims from every Muslim-majority society and from diasporic Muslim populations worldwide converge on Mecca to perform the sequence the Prophet established in his Farewell Pilgrimage of 632: the *iḥrām* (sacralised state), the seven circumambulations of the Kaʿba (*ṭawāf*), the seven traversals between *Ṣafā* and *Marwa* (*saʿy*), the standing at *ʿArafāt* (*wuqūf*), the night at *Muzdalifa*, the symbolic stoning at *Minā*, the sacrifice and the closing rites. The *ʿUmra* permits the abbreviated form throughout the year. No other civilization sustains a comparable ritual concentration: a single geographic point receiving in continuous succession the bodies of the global community of believers, each performing the same disciplined sequence the tradition has transmitted for fourteen centuries. The continuity, regardless of which dynasty has held the territory, is the structural fact.

[[Harmonism]] holds that *Bilād al-Ḥaramayn* encodes a precise civilizational *Dharma* that exceeds any specific Saudi-political settlement. The cosmological substrate Arabia preserves — the Qurʾanic revelation and its custodial geography, the integrated Islamic learning the Hijaz transmitted across centuries, the *muḥaddithūn* (Hadith-scholarship) tradition the Arabian and broader *umma*-wide scholars built across the formative period, the broader Islamic philosophical-jurisprudential-contemplative apparatus the elder Arabian tradition operated within — converges with what Harmonism articulates at doctrinal register. Reading Saudi Arabia rightly through the [[Architecture of Harmony]] reveals both the convergence and the specific eighteenth-century rupture that the contemporary Saudi state apparatus operates from.

---

## The Living Substrate

Five recognitions name what Arabia preserves at the structural level.

**The custodianship of Mecca and Medina as structural-religious responsibility.** The two cities precede the Saudi state by approximately twelve centuries. The *Kaʿba* predates Islam and was reconsecrated through the Prophet's mission as the qibla and the destination of the obligatory pilgrimage for every Muslim with means and capacity. *Madīna* is the city of the *hijra*, the Prophet's mosque, the formative community of the *Ṣaḥāba*. Whoever holds the territory inherits the obligation. The Hashemite Sharifate held the custodianship for roughly a thousand years before the 1924–1925 Saudi conquest of the Hijaz; the Saud family has held it since. The Ḥajj infrastructure built across the post-1973 oil-revenue period — the expansion of the Grand Mosque, the Prophet's Mosque expansion, the hotel-and-transport apparatus for pilgrim flows of millions, the logistical capacity to feed-and-shelter-and-move the pilgrim mass at *ʿArafāt* and *Minā* across the *ayyām al-tashrīq* — represents a genuine institutional achievement at scale no prior custodian managed. The construction has been undertaken with a destructive logic the elder tradition would have refused. Historical structures dating to the early Islamic period and continuing through Ottoman expansions have been demolished to make space for hotel towers and access infrastructure, including portions of the Ottoman *Ajyad* fortress (demolished 2002), the Mosque of Bilāl, the house of Khadīja, and most of the Ottoman-period architectural fabric surrounding the Grand Mosque. The Abraj al-Bait clock-tower complex looms directly over the *Masjid al-Ḥarām* in a relation between commercial-vertical-development and the sanctuary that the elder Islamic architectural tradition would have read as misordering. The construction has proceeded under Wahhabi-Salafi doctrinal cover that the prevention of grave-veneration justifies the demolition; the broader Islamic architectural-and-historical tradition that produced fourteen centuries of accumulated heritage in these cities has been treated as expendable material against the demolition logic.

**The Qurʾanic revelation in its custodial geography.** The text the Prophet received between roughly 610 and 632, in the Arabic of his community, in the Hijaz, with the structural relation between the verses revealed at Mecca and those revealed at Medina, is the foundational fact of Islamic civilization. The *muṣḥaf* (codex), standardised under ʿUthmān around 650, has been preserved in a textual tradition more closely controlled than any comparable scripture's history. The Qurʾanic recitation tradition (*tajwīd*, the seven and ten canonical readings) operates as continuous oral-aural transmission. The Arabian Peninsula's relation to the text is custodial in the structural sense the language permits: the Arabic of the Qurʾan operates within and against the broader Arabic of the contemporary Arabian dialects; the Hijaz holds the geographic memory of the revelation events. The contemporary Saudi state has appropriated the custodial relation for legitimation purposes that the text itself does not authorise. The *Salafi* claim that contemporary practice should hew to "the practice of the *salaf*" (the early generations) operates as state-religious-apparatus claim within a specific doctrinal interpretation; the broader Islamic tradition's millennium of scholarly engagement with the same text produced positions Saudi institutional Islam routinely declares illegitimate. The text precedes the state's claim to interpret it.

**The Hadith-scholarship tradition as intellectual substrate.** The *muḥaddithūn* of the third and fourth Islamic centuries built one of the most rigorous documentary-critical apparatus any civilization has produced. *Muḥammad ibn Ismāʿīl al-Bukhārī* (810–870) was Central Asian and assembled the *Ṣaḥīḥ* — approximately 7,000 reports selected from an examined corpus the tradition records as exceeding 600,000, with each chain (*isnād*) authenticated through the *ʿilm al-rijāl* critical apparatus. *Muslim ibn al-Ḥajjāj al-Naysābūrī* (815–875) was Persian and assembled the second of the two *Ṣaḥīḥayn*. *Abū Dāwūd*, *al-Tirmidhī*, *al-Nasāʾī*, and *Ibn Māja* completed the *kutub al-sitta*. The tradition's geographic distribution — Central Asia, Iran, Iraq, the Hijaz — names the broader *umma*-wide scholarship of which the Hijaz was one node rather than the sole custodian. The contemporary Saudi-Salafi appropriation of the Hadith corpus has produced a specific selective reading. The classical *muḥaddithūn* operated within an integrated tradition that combined Hadith scholarship with *fiqh*, with *kalām*, with *taṣawwuf*; al-Bukhārī's own treatise *al-Adab al-Mufrad* operates with assumptions about ethical-spiritual cultivation that the contemporary state-religious apparatus has progressively constrained. The corpus is the inheritance of the broader *umma*; the contemporary institutional framing of who counts as authoritative reader of it is not the corpus speaking but a specific interpretive apparatus claiming the corpus.

**The Hanbali jurisprudential tradition as legitimate madhhab distinct from Wahhabi capture.** *Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal* (780–855) is the Iraqi traditionist whose juridical school is the smallest of the four canonical Sunni *madhāhib*, structurally the most text-focused, with the *Musnad* he assembled standing as one of the largest Hadith compilations. The Hanbali tradition has carried two distinct inheritances. *Ibn Taymiyya* (1263–1328), the Syrian Hanbali revivalist whose work the Wahhabi tradition has appropriated as foundational, articulated specific positions on theological literalism, on visiting graves, and on the proper relation between *ʿaql* (reason) and *naql* (transmission) that the Wahhabi-Salafi current has carried forward selectively. *Abdul Qādir al-Jīlānī* (1077–1166), the Persian-Iraqi Hanbali jurist whose *Ghunyat al-Ṭālibīn* and *al-Fatḥ al-Rabbānī* operate as integrated juridical-and-Sufi articulation, founded the *Qādiriyya* — one of the largest Sufi orders globally, with continuous transmission to the present across the *umma*. The same juridical school produced both: the literalist-reformist trajectory the contemporary Saudi institutional apparatus operates from, and the integrated juridical-Sufi trajectory the contemporary state actively suppresses. Hanbalism is not Wahhabism, and the contemporary identification of the two is a Wahhabi achievement, not a Hanbali fact. Most non-specialist contemporary readers — Muslim and non-Muslim — encounter the Hanbali tradition only through its Wahhabi-Saudi institutional voice, with the broader Hanbali inheritance progressively forgotten under that institutional dominance.

**The pre-Wahhabi Hijazi cosmopolitan tradition.** The Hijaz before 1925, under nominal Ottoman suzerainty and Hashemite Sharifian custodianship, operated as a cosmopolitan-Islamic crossroads. The Ḥajj brought together Indonesian, South Asian, West African, North African, Persian, Turkish, Central Asian, and Sub-Saharan African Muslims annually, and many remained to study at the *Masjid al-Ḥarām* and at the Prophet's Mosque, where the *ḥalqāt* (study circles) operated across all four Sunni *madhāhib* and integrated with the *taṣawwuf* tradition. Mecca and Medina were among the *umma*'s most cosmopolitan cities, with *zawāyā* of the Naqshbandiyya, Shādhiliyya, Qādiriyya, and other orders operating openly. The Maliki-Hijazi *muḥaddith* lineage continued into the twentieth century through the *al-Mālikī* family of Mecca: *Sayyid ʿAlawī al-Mālikī al-Ḥasanī* (1909–1971) and his son *Muḥammad ibn ʿAlawī al-Mālikī al-Ḥasanī* (1944–2004), one of the most authoritative late-twentieth-century Sunni scholars and a public critic of Wahhabi-Salafi reformism from inside Mecca itself. Muḥammad al-Mālikī's *Mafāhīm Yajib an Tuṣaḥḥaḥ* (Concepts That Should Be Corrected) responded to Wahhabi positions with the classical Sunni scholarly apparatus drawn from the broader madhhab-and-Sufi tradition. He was harassed and his teaching constrained but not killed; the contemporary state's relation to the surviving Hijazi traditional scholarly families operates within boundaries that fluctuate with state needs. The pre-Wahhabi Hijazi tradition survived the 1925 conquest in fragmentary form and continues today at the level of specific scholarly families and the diasporic networks they shaped (the Yemeni *Bā ʿAlawī* networks operating from the Ḥaḍramawt across the global Muslim diaspora carry related transmissions), but the institutional dominance of the Saudi-Wahhabi apparatus has rendered most of the surviving Hijazi tradition invisible to contemporary Muslim youth raised within the state's religious-educational frame.

Saudi Arabia's case is distinguished by the simultaneity of structural-religious inheritance the *Khādim al-Ḥaramayn* title encodes and the specific eighteenth-century settlement that captured the inheritance and exported its specific reformist articulation globally across the late twentieth century.

---

## The Center: Dharma

### Custodianship and Tawḥīd as Civilizational Telos

The Arabic-Islamic tradition carries terms approaching what Sanskrit names *Dharma* and what Harmonism articulates as alignment with Logos. The most ancient and structurally weightiest is *tawḥīd* — the recognition of divine unity, the doctrine that there is no reality alongside the One Reality, that the *shahāda* "*lā ilāha illā Allāh*" names the structural fact rather than a confessional preference. *Tawḥīd* in classical Islamic theology operates at three traditionally distinguished registers: *tawḥīd al-rubūbiyya* (oneness of lordship), *tawḥīd al-ulūhiyya* (oneness of worship), *tawḥīd al-asmāʾ wa-l-ṣifāt* (oneness of names and attributes). The contemporary Wahhabi-Salafi apparatus has narrowed the lived emphasis to *tawḥīd al-ulūhiyya* operationalised as anti-grave-and-saint-veneration discipline, with the broader Islamic philosophical-mystical articulation of *tawḥīd* — Ibn ʿArabī's *waḥdat al-wujūd* (unity of being), al-Ghazālī's articulation in the *Iḥyāʾ ʿUlūm al-Dīn*, the integrated articulation the broader Sufi tradition carries — actively constrained. The convergence with Harmonism's [[Tawhid and the Architecture of the One]] is at the philosophical-theological register; the contemporary state's narrowed operational definition is a specific reformist articulation rather than the doctrine itself.

The Islamic-Arabic articulation of Dharma at the human-conduct register operates through *taqwā* (God-consciousness), *iḥsān* (excellence in worship, the third register of the Gabriel-tradition *islām*-*īmān*-*iḥsān* cascade), *ʿadl* (justice), *ʿibāda* (worship-as-orientation), and the integrated framework the *Sharīʿa* articulates. The Sufi articulation of the cascade — *Sharīʿa-Ṭarīqa-Ḥaqīqa* (outer law, inner path, ultimate Reality) — names the structural continuity between juridical observance, contemplative cultivation, and realised recognition. The Saudi-Salafi institutional apparatus has progressively constrained the *Ṭarīqa* register within its institutional framing; the substrate persists outside the institutional dominance. The integration of *Sharīʿa*-and-*Ṭarīqa*-and-*Ḥaqīqa* into one articulation of *Dīn* is the broader Islamic civilizational achievement; the contemporary Saudi constraint of the *Ṭarīqa* register is one specific recent settlement against a millennium of integrated practice.

### The Islamic Cosmology as Harmonic Realism

The Qurʾanic articulation of the cosmos operates as ontological statement. The recurring formula "to Him belongs whatever is in the heavens and the earth" names the inherent harmonic order; the *āyāt* (signs) that the natural world manifests are the perceptible expression of the divine-creative principle. The *mīzān* (balance) the Qurʾan articulates names the inherent ordering of the cosmos that human conduct can align with or violate. The *fiṭra* (primordial constitution) names the human being's structural orientation toward *tawḥīd*. The classical Islamic philosophical-theological tradition extended the articulation through Avicennan ontology, through al-Ghazālian articulation of *ʿālam al-malakūt* (the world of dominion) alongside *ʿālam al-mulk* (the world of manifestation), through Ibn ʿArabī's articulation of the *aʿyān al-thābita* (immutable archetypes) and the divine-name structure of creation. The convergence with [[Harmonic Realism]] is at every register the broader Islamic philosophical-mystical tradition carries.

The contemporary Wahhabi-Salafi articulation has progressively constrained the cosmological substrate to literalist-textualist register. The *kalām* tradition through *al-Ashʿarī* and *al-Māturīdī*, the Avicennan philosophical apparatus, the Ibn ʿArabian metaphysical articulation, and the broader integrated cosmological apparatus the Muslim tradition transmitted for a millennium have been progressively excluded from the contemporary Saudi institutional curriculum. The cosmological substrate persists within the broader *umma*-wide tradition (in Egyptian al-Azhar before its progressive Salafi alignment, in the Maghrebi Ashʿarī-Mālikī-Junaydī integration, in the Mauritanian *Maḥāḍir* tradition, in the Yemeni Bā ʿAlawī networks, in the Indonesian NU institutional apparatus, in the Indian-Pakistani Barelvi tradition, in the Iranian *ḥawza* training); the contemporary Saudi institutional Islam operates as one specific reformist articulation against this broader cosmological inheritance. The recovery direction is the disentanglement of the broader Islamic cosmological inheritance from the contemporary state-Wahhabi-Salafi institutional constraint rather than the rejection of the inheritance because of the institutional appropriation.

### Soul-Register: The Cartography Severed at Source, Surviving Elsewhere

Saudi Arabia's soul-register has a structurally distinctive shape: the country that holds the geography of the revelation is the country in which the contemplative cartography the broader Islamic tradition mapped has been most aggressively suppressed institutionally. The Sufi Cartography — the seven stations of the *nafs*, the *laṭāʾif* of the subtle anatomy, the methods of *dhikr* and *murāqaba*, the horizon of *fanāʾ* and *baqāʾ*, the *insān kāmil* — is treated at depth in [[The Sufi Cartography of the Soul]] and [[The Hollowing of the Muslim Soul]]. This cartography was developed within the broader Islamic tradition across fourteen centuries by scholars and masters from across the *umma*, including masters who lived and taught in the Hijaz; the Hijaz before 1925 carried *zawāyā* of multiple orders; the 1925 conquest of the Hijaz destroyed those institutional vessels and the contemporary Saudi institutional apparatus actively suppresses their reconstruction. The cartography is not Saudi-foreign; the cartography is Arabian-native and was institutionally severed at its source within the lifetime of grandparents.

The dedicated cross-cartographic treatment lives in the [[The Sufi Cartography of the Soul]], [[The Five Cartographies of the Soul]], [[The Hollowing of the Muslim Soul]], and [[Religion and Harmonism]]. Saudi Arabia's specific configuration: the cartography survives within the broader *umma*-wide preservation (Moroccan Sufi-Maliki substrate, Mauritanian *Maḥāḍir*, West African Tijānī, Egyptian Sufi networks, Yemeni Bā ʿAlawī, Indonesian NU, Pakistani Barelvi, post-Soviet recovering lineages); the Saudi-internal channels of transmission operate at fragmentary survival under institutional constraint. What Harmonism contributes is the cross-cartographic verification: the territory the Sufi tradition names — the heart-work, the *fanāʾ-baqāʾ* dynamic, the integration of breath-mind-heart through systematic practice — is the same territory the Indian Tantric-Haṭha tradition reaches through Sanskrit vocabulary, the Russian hesychast tradition reaches through Greek-Slavonic vocabulary, the Andean Q'ero tradition reaches through Quechua vocabulary, and the Chinese *neidan* tradition reaches through Chinese vocabulary. The cross-cartographic recognition strengthens rather than dilutes the Arabian inheritance; the inheritance is real even where the institutional channels at home are constrained. [[The Guru and the Guide]] articulates the structural endpoint: cultivation forms are vehicles, and the highest purpose of integrated cultivation is the production of realised practitioners who stand on the direct ground rather than perpetual adherents to the form.

---

## 1. Ecology

The Arabian Peninsula carries one of the planet's most distinctive ecologies. The *Rubʿ al-Khālī* (Empty Quarter) — approximately 650,000 square kilometres of the world's largest contiguous sand desert — and the broader Nafud and Dahna desert systems define the territory. The *Asīr* mountain range along the southwestern edge carries the only sustained-rainfall ecology in the kingdom, with terraced agriculture continuing in fragmentary form. The Red Sea coast carries among the planet's most intact tropical-marine ecologies in pockets, alongside the *NEOM*-region coastal development. Pre-modern Arabian ecology operated within the structural constraints of extreme aridity: the *falaj* (subterranean aqueduct, analogous to the Iranian *qanat*) tradition managing limited water; date-palm cultivation as core agricultural apparatus; camel-based nomadic pastoralism operating across the desert margins; the *ḥimā* tradition of communal land-and-water reserves that the Prophet specifically authorised and that operated as functional ecological commons across centuries.

The contemporary deformation operates at scale exceeding most comparable cases. Saudi groundwater depletion has been severe — the kingdom's aquifer systems were depleted across the late twentieth century by industrial-agricultural expansion, with the wheat-self-sufficiency programme of the 1980s producing massive non-renewable groundwater drawdown before its eventual reversal in the 2010s. The urbanisation of the peninsula has produced cities (Riyadh, Jeddah, Mecca, Medina, Dammam) in geographic conditions requiring massive desalination and energy import to sustain. The desalination apparatus is among the world's largest, producing brine-discharge and energy-intensity costs comparable cases face. The *NEOM* development on the northwestern coast — the proposed *The Line* linear city, the *Trojena* mountain resort, the broader Vision 2030 mega-project portfolio — operates in ecologically sensitive territory at scale whose environmental consequences exceed standard project-impact assessment. The carbon-emissions footprint of the kingdom (among the world's highest per-capita emitters) operates as structural feature of the oil-revenue-petrostate logic.

The recovery direction is the realignment of Saudi ecological response with the substrate the broader Islamic and the pre-state Arabian tradition carry: the *ḥimā* reserves reactivated as functional ecological commons rather than as cultural-tourism marker; the integration of *khalīfa* (stewardship) substrate with contemporary agricultural-and-urban planning; the constraint of the mega-project logic against the underlying ecological carrying capacity; the development of regional renewable-energy apparatus the Saudi geographic conditions specifically favour. The substrate exists in surviving traditional knowledge across Asīr and the Najdi interior; the structural conditions for recovery are constrained by the development-priority logic the post-1973 oil-economy adopted alongside the Vision 2030 mega-project programme.

---

## 2. Health

The Arabian Peninsula carries pre-modern medical substrate within the broader Islamic medical tradition. The *Tibb al-Nabawī* (Prophetic Medicine) tradition — the systematic integration of herbal pharmacopoeia (black-seed *nigella sativa*, honey, dates, olive oil, the *miswāk* tooth-stick) with dietary discipline, fasting practice, and embodied-spiritual cultivation — operated as integrated medical tradition alongside the broader Avicennan apparatus the Islamic Golden Age developed. The Arabian *bedouin* medical apparatus — knowledge of desert plants, cautery practice, traditional bone-setting — operated alongside the broader Islamic medical tradition. The Ramadan fasting practice operates as one of the world's largest sustained population-level intermittent-fasting protocols, with metabolic benefits the contemporary biohacking culture has rediscovered without recognising its civilizational embedding. The Arabian dietary substrate (dates, camel and goat milk and yoghurt, lamb-and-rice integration, fermented dairy *laban*) carried specific health properties under pre-industrial conditions.

The contemporary deformation operates at registers approaching the worst-case industrialising-nation health transition. Saudi diabetes prevalence (approximately 18 percent of adults, among the world's highest), obesity rates (approximately 35 percent of adults, among the world's highest), cardiovascular disease burden, and metabolic syndrome conditions reflect the rapid transition from traditional dietary substrate to industrialised processed-food consumption across a single generation. The oil-revenue-funded subsidisation of imported processed food, the cultural-prestige reorganisation around Western-style consumption, the displacement of the traditional active-pastoral life by sedentary-urban patterns, and the constraint of female outdoor exercise across portions of the post-1979 institutional-religious settlement have compounded. The Saudi biomedical apparatus has been built at scale through oil-revenue funding (the King Faisal Specialist Hospital, the King Saud University Medical City, the broader hospital-and-medical-school apparatus), with significant capacity for tertiary-care delivery alongside the systemic biases of the broader biomedical model and structural integration into the pharmaceutical-industry research-and-development apparatus that [[Big Pharma]] treats at register.

The recovery direction is the reactivation of *Tibb al-Nabawī* and the broader Islamic medical tradition as primary-care architecture rather than as adjunct cultural marker; the reform of Saudi food systems toward the traditional Arabian substrate against the imported industrial-processed pattern; the integration of the Ramadan-fasting discipline as continuous cultivation rather than as annual ritual marker; the expansion of physical cultivation practice across portions of the population the contemporary settlement has constrained from regular movement; the integration of soul-cultivation apparatus into mental-health care rather than as separate domain. The substrate exists at depth; the institutional integration operates within state-religious-apparatus constraints.

---

## 3. Kinship

Saudi kinship substrate carries one of the contemporary world's most intact extended-family architectures. The tribal substrate (*qabīla*, *ʿashīra*, *ʿāʾila*) operates beneath the formal state-administrative apparatus; tribal identity continues to organise marriage, dispute-resolution, and economic-coordination patterns across portions of the Saudi population. The multigenerational household remains more common in Saudi Arabia than in comparable middle-and-high-income economies. The *Ramadan* and *ʿĪd* festival-and-gathering cycle, the weekly *jumʿa* (Friday prayer-and-gathering), the extended-family obligations the *ṣilat al-raḥim* (maintaining family ties) ethical-religious obligation reinforces, and the integration of family-religious-community apparatus operate as substrate the broader Saudi society maintains. The Saudi total fertility rate (approximately 2.4) operates above the replacement threshold, distinguishing Saudi Arabia from comparable economies that have transitioned below replacement.

The substrate operates alongside specific institutional arrangements the contemporary state apparatus and the post-1979 social settlement produced. The male-guardianship apparatus operated for decades as institutional reduction of female agency the broader Islamic juridical tradition's range of positions would not have universally required; the post-2017 reforms have constrained the apparatus without dissolving its underlying structural logic. The migrant-labour apparatus — Saudi Arabia hosts approximately 13 million expatriate workers, primarily from South Asia, the Philippines, Egypt, Sudan, and Yemen, operating under the *kafāla* (sponsorship) system that the broader Islamic juridical tradition's articulation on the rights of workers would condemn — produces structural arrangements between the Saudi citizen population and the migrant population the broader Islamic-ethical tradition would diagnose as unjust. The internal generational-cultural distance the post-2017 social-liberalisation programme has produced between older and younger Saudi populations operates as another inflection of the broader transition.

The contemporary strain operates within the broader generic-modernity transition with country-specific inflections. The urbanisation patterns; the educational expansion (female literacy and university enrolment now substantial); the consumer-economy transition; the social-media penetration; the partial brain-drain of portions of the Saudi educated class to Gulf-regional and Western diasporic positions. The structural reforms required would be specific: the constraint of the *kafāla* system toward broader recognition of migrant-worker rights per the Islamic juridical tradition's own articulation; the completion of the post-2017 reforms to female autonomy along lines the broader Islamic tradition's range of positions would support; the structural support of the multigenerational household as supported rather than constrained by housing-and-employment policy; the integration of contemporary Saudi family-formation conditions with the substrate the elder Arabian tradition carries. The substrate is largely intact; the specific institutional arrangements operate with qualifications the elder tradition would refine.

---

## 4. Stewardship

Arabia preserves craft traditions: the *bisht* (cloak) weaving tradition, the *sadu* Bedouin textile tradition, Najdi-and-Hijazi traditional architecture (the mud-brick urban fabric of historic Diriyah, the Asīri stone-and-wood mountain architecture, the Hijazi *rawshan* wood-screen apparatus), Arabian metalwork and jewellery, the Bedouin leatherwork, the date-palm-product crafts that the Arabian-traditional household operated within. The *ustādh-mutaʿallim* master-apprentice form operated across these lineages. The Saudi industrial substrate operates within the oil-and-petrochemical complex (*Saudi Aramco* operating as one of the world's largest companies by reserves and production, *SABIC* operating as integrated petrochemical apparatus, the broader downstream-industrial apparatus the post-1973 oil revenue funded).

The contemporary deformation operates at registers. Saudi industrialisation has produced industrial capacity concentrated in the oil-petrochemical sector, with limited diversification across other manufacturing sectors despite repeated state-led diversification programmes (the Five-Year Plans across the 1970s and 1980s, the post-2016 Vision 2030 diversification). The cultural-tourism economies operating around the surviving traditional crafts (Asīr Province cultural-heritage programmes, the Diriyah historical-restoration programme) operate alongside the broader degradation of master-class transmission. The *kafāla* migrant-labour apparatus has structurally constrained the development of a domestic-craft-and-manufacturing apprenticeship economy by routing most craft-and-manufacturing labour through the migrant-worker channel. The traditional substrate operates fragmentarily.

The recovery direction requires the institutional support of long-duration apprenticeship distinct from the credentialised educational system; the master-apprentice form's reactivation as primary craft-transmission infrastructure; the structural reform of the *kafāla* apparatus toward conditions permitting the development of a domestic apprenticeship economy; the reform of the oil-petrochemical concentration toward the broader diversification the Vision 2030 programme nominally targets but has structurally constrained through the megaproject-prioritisation logic. The substrate exists in cultural memory and in surviving lineages; the structural conditions for reactivation depend on policy choices the contemporary state has constrained.

---

## 5. Finance

Saudi Arabia carries one of the most distinctive contemporary financial positions among major economies, structurally determined by the oil-revenue-funded sovereign-wealth apparatus and the specific role the kingdom plays in the global dollar-petroleum system. The *Saudi Aramco* IPO (2019, partial listing on the Riyadh *Tadawul*) valued the company among the world's most consequential. The *Public Investment Fund* (PIF, approximately $940 billion in assets as of 2025) operates as sovereign-wealth-and-development apparatus, with major holdings across global asset-management apparatus and a structural transition under MbS toward both global asset acquisition and domestic-megaproject deployment. The Saudi riyal has been pegged to the US dollar at approximately 3.75 since 1986, providing monetary stability at the cost of monetary-policy sovereignty.

The structural-historical fact organising Saudi financial position is the 1945 *USS Quincy* meeting between Franklin Roosevelt and King Abdulaziz ibn Saud, and the broader post-WWII US-Saudi strategic settlement that emerged from it. The settlement: US security guarantee for the Saudi state in exchange for Saudi oil-supply reliability and dollar-denominated pricing of oil exports. The 1973–74 oil-pricing reorganisation following the *Yom Kippur War* and the subsequent OPEC oil embargo produced the *petrodollar* system as fully-articulated structural arrangement — Saudi Arabia and the broader OPEC apparatus priced oil exclusively in US dollars, accumulated the resulting dollar surplus in US Treasury securities and broader US dollar-denominated assets, and the US dollar gained the structural-demand foundation sustaining its global-reserve-currency status through the broader post-Bretton-Woods period. The reported 2024 lapse of the formal 50-year US-Saudi security-oil agreement, without formal renewal under conditions the Saudi state has not publicly clarified, has not yet produced full structural realignment but signals the architecture is under reconfiguration. The pre-modern Islamic financial substrate operates at specific registers within Saudi financial practice. The Islamic prohibition on *ribā* (usury/interest) supplies substrate for non-interest-based financial apparatus operating alongside the dollar-conventional financial structure. The Saudi *ṣukūk* (Islamic bonds) apparatus, the broader Islamic-finance institutional development the Saudi state has supported across the late twentieth and twenty-first centuries, and the *waqf* (religious endowment) tradition operate within the broader Saudi financial apparatus. The Islamic-finance apparatus operates in many cases as cosmetic-Islamic surface on conventional financial logic, with the *ribā*-and-*gharar*-prohibitions navigated through legal-structural workarounds the broader Islamic juridical tradition's deepest articulation would refuse. The substrate carries the apparatus; the institutional realisation operates with deformations.

The recovery direction is the disciplining of Saudi financial apparatus by the Islamic-ethical substrate the broader Islamic juridical tradition articulates: the deepening of Islamic-finance apparatus toward genuine *ribā*-and-*gharar*-avoidance rather than legal-structural workaround; the disciplining of the PIF megaproject deployment toward investments serving the underlying civilizational *Dharma* rather than the prestige-and-spectacle logic; the reform of *kafāla* apparatus as financial-structural condition the broader Islamic-economic apparatus would condemn; the development of post-petrodollar financial-architectural integration with broader BRICS-and-multipolar apparatus (treated below) on terms the substrate's deepest articulation would support. The substrate exists; the institutional realisation operates within the constraints of the contemporary state-oil-and-financial complex.

---

## 6. Governance

Two structural patterns sit at the foundation of contemporary Saudi governance, and Harmonism cannot honestly read Saudi Arabia without naming them: the *Saud-Wahhab pact* of 1744 operates as foundational political-religious architecture across roughly three centuries of subsequent Saudi state-formation, and the contemporary Saudi state operates as absolute monarchy with religious-institutional cover the broader Islamic political-philosophical tradition's deepest articulation would refuse.

**The Saud-Wahhab pact and its civilizational consequences.** In 1744 at *al-Dirʿiyya* (north of contemporary Riyadh), *Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb* (1703–1792) entered alliance with *Muḥammad ibn Saʿūd* (1687–1765), the local *amīr*. The pact: religious legitimacy from the Wahhabi articulation in exchange for political-military support for its propagation. The First Saudi State (1744–1818) expanded across portions of the Arabian Peninsula before being destroyed by Egyptian-Ottoman forces under Ibrahim Pasha. The Second Saudi State (1824–1891) operated at reduced reach. The Third Saudi State — founded by *King Abdulaziz ibn Saud* (1875–1953) in 1902 with the capture of Riyadh, expanded across Najd and Hasa across the 1910s, conquered the Hijaz from the Hashemites in 1924–1925, and consolidated as the *Kingdom of Saudi Arabia* in 1932 — is the contemporary Saudi state. The Saud-Wahhab pact has structured every iteration: the *Āl al-Shaykh* (descendants of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab) has continuously held senior religious-institutional positions across the kingdom (the *Mufti* position, the *Council of Senior Scholars* leadership, the *Ministry of Islamic Affairs* and related apparatus), and the religious establishment has provided legitimation for Saudi state authority across the broader political-economic trajectory.

The Wahhabi doctrinal articulation that the pact propagated carries specific positions the broader Islamic tradition has variously refused: radical literalist *tawḥīd* operationalised as anti-grave-veneration and anti-saint-intercession discipline, the broader *takfīr* apparatus (declaration of other Muslims as unbelievers based on specific deviations from the Wahhabi-articulated *tawḥīd*), the systematic suppression of Sufi orders and Shia practice within reach of the state, the constraint of Sunni *kalām* and philosophical traditions the elder *umma*-wide scholarship had integrated. The 1925 conquest of the Hijaz operationalised the doctrinal articulation through institutional violence: the demolition of saint-shrines and Ottoman-period heritage across the Hijaz, the destruction of the *al-Baqīʿ* cemetery in Medina (1925, completed 1926) containing the graves of members of the Prophet's family and the earliest *Ṣaḥāba*, the demolition of the *Jannat al-Muʿallā* cemetery in Mecca where the Prophet's mother was buried, the closure of operating Sufi *zawāyā*, the expulsion or constraint of non-Wahhabi scholarly families. A specific reformist articulation, originating in eighteenth-century desert Arabia, was institutionalised as the religious-establishment apparatus of the state that holds custodianship of the two cities the broader *umma* regards as inheritance.

**The contemporary state structure and Mohammed bin Salman's consolidation.** The Saudi state operates as absolute monarchy. The *Basic Law of Governance* (1992) names the Qurʾan and *Sunna* as the constitution, with the king holding executive, legislative, and judicial supreme authority. The *Council of Senior Scholars* operates as religious-legitimation apparatus; the *Allegiance Council* (*Hayʾat al-Bayʿa*, established 2006) operates as succession-formalisation mechanism. The contemporary state apparatus has progressively concentrated authority under *Mohammed bin Salman* (MbS, Crown Prince since 2017, effective ruler given King Salman's age) across multiple registers: the November 2017 detention of approximately two hundred princes, businessmen, and former officials at the Ritz-Carlton Riyadh on corruption charges — the resulting forced asset-transfers (estimated at $100 billion in recovered assets) consolidated MbS's economic-political authority while operating outside any standard judicial process; the systematic consolidation of the security-services apparatus under MbS's direct control; the constraint of internal opposition (the 2019 detentions of female activists who had campaigned for the right-to-drive reform; the broader detention apparatus); the assassination of *Jamal Khashoggi* in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul (October 2, 2018) under conditions the US intelligence assessment attributed to MbS's authorisation; the Yemen-war direction since 2015 (treated below in Defense). The MbS-era trajectory has paired internal-political consolidation with social-liberalisation (the 2017 lifting of the female driving ban, the 2018 reopening of cinemas, the 2019 *Muṭawwiʿīn* / religious-police reduction in public-enforcement authority, the broader Vision 2030 social transformation programme) and with global-strategic realignment (the 2023 China-mediated Iran-Saudi normalisation, the Israel-Saudi normalisation track partially constrained by post-October-7 conditions).

**The recovery direction.** The Saudi governance recovery is not the importation of Western liberal-democratic forms — the broader Islamic political tradition has articulated alternatives the Western liberal-democratic model does not exhaust, and [[Liberalism and Harmonism]] and [[The Hollowing of the West]] treat the structural problems with the Western model at length. It is the structural reactivation of indigenous resources for legitimate governance: the *Khulafāʾ al-Rāshidūn* (the Rightly-Guided Caliphs) model of *shūrā* (consultation) and *bayʿa* (allegiance) operating as legitimacy condition; the Qurʾanic articulation of *shūrā* as constitutional principle (Qurʾan 42:38, 3:159) the broader Islamic juridical tradition has continuously articulated; the *jamāʿa* (community-consensus) substrate operating in tribal-Arabian institutional memory; the Islamic juridical articulation that legitimate authority requires *taqwā* and *ʿadl* as conditions rather than as decorative cultural-religious surface. The structural reforms required would be specific: the constraint of the internal-security apparatus' political-coercive scope; the development of *shūrā*-substrate institutional apparatus distinct from the existing *Majlis al-Shūrā* (Consultative Council, currently fully-appointed and lacking legislative authority); genuine accountability for the Khashoggi assassination and the broader detention-apparatus operations the contemporary monarchical apparatus has constrained from public examination; the accommodation of religious-and-regional diversity within the kingdom (the *Hijaz*, the *Eastern Province* Shia population, the *ʿAsīr*, the *Najran* Ismaili population) the centralised-Najdi-Wahhabi apparatus has constrained; the reform of the *kafāla* migrant-labour apparatus toward broader recognition of worker-rights the Islamic juridical tradition's own articulation would support. The structural pre-condition: the disentanglement of contemporary Saudi state authority from the specific Wahhabi-doctrinal apparatus the 1744 pact institutionalised, toward the broader Islamic political-philosophical tradition's range of positions the contemporary state has constrained.

---

## 7. Defense

Saudi Arabia operates one of the world's largest defense budgets in absolute terms (approximately $75 billion in 2024) and among the largest relative to GDP. The Saudi armed forces — the regular Royal Saudi Armed Forces operating alongside the *Saudi Arabian National Guard* (SANG, the parallel-military apparatus drawn from tribal-loyalist segments and reporting directly to the royal apparatus) — operate with extensive Western-aligned equipment integration (US, UK, French, Spanish military exports) and with structural dependence on the broader US security architecture for upper-tier-strategic protection. The *Gulf Cooperation Council* (GCC, founded 1981 with Kuwait, Bahrain, UAE, Qatar, Oman) operates as regional security-coordination apparatus though with limited operational integration. The Saudi-led intervention in Yemen since 2015 has been the largest and most consequential Saudi military operation since the 1990–91 Gulf War.

**The Yemen war as civilizational diagnosis.** The March 2015 Saudi-led coalition intervention against the *Houthi* forces (*Anṣār Allāh*, the Zaydi-Shia movement that had captured *Ṣanʿāʾ* in September 2014) was framed as restoration of the Hadi government and constraint of Iranian regional influence. The war has produced one of the world's most severe humanitarian catastrophes: estimated direct conflict deaths exceeding 150,000, broader excess-mortality (including disease, famine, and infrastructure-collapse mortality) exceeding 377,000 by mid-2022 UN estimate, the cholera epidemic of 2017–2019 producing approximately 2.5 million cases, mass internal displacement, and the structural collapse of Yemeni infrastructure and food security. The Saudi-coalition airstrike campaign has produced documented attacks on civilian infrastructure (hospitals, schools, water-and-sanitation systems, weddings, funerals, school buses) the broader Islamic juridical tradition's articulation on the conduct of war (the *ḥurma* of non-combatants, the prohibition of attack on water-and-food infrastructure, the prohibition of destruction of religious sites) would condemn. The April 2022 truce and the broader post-2023 China-mediated Iran-Saudi normalisation have produced relative reduction in active combat, but the war remains formally unresolved and the structural conditions producing it remain in place.

**The substrate and recovery direction.** The substrate Saudi Arabia retains in the Defense pillar includes the broader Islamic *jihād* doctrine's articulation of just-war conditions (the *ḥurma* of non-combatants, the requirement of just cause and proportionality, the prohibition on aggressive expansion), the Qurʾanic articulation that "whoever kills an innocent soul... it is as if he killed all of humanity" (Qurʾan 5:32), and the broader Islamic ethical apparatus that legitimate force is force disciplined by ethical cultivation. The recovery direction is the subordination of the strategic-sovereign capacity to the underlying civilizational *Dharma*: defense as last resort disciplined by the Islamic just-war tradition's own articulation; the completion of the Yemen war on terms recognising the structural costs of continuation and the humanitarian responsibility for what has been done; the rebuilding of a defense culture grounded in the recognition that Saudi sovereignty is for the sake of *Khādim al-Ḥaramayn* obligations rather than for regional-influence-projection; the constraint of the MIC's domestic-political-economic weight; the disentanglement from structural dependence on the US security architecture toward genuine strategic-sovereign capacity disciplined by the Islamic-ethical substrate. The strategic capacity is real; the question is the *Dharma* under which the capacity operates.

---

## 8. Education

Saudi Arabia's educational tradition carries the depth of the broader Islamic learning tradition the Hijaz historically transmitted. The pre-modern *Masjid al-Ḥarām* and Prophet's Mosque study circles operated as integrated learning apparatus across the four Sunni *madhāhib* and integrated with the *taṣawwuf* tradition until the 1925 Saudi conquest progressively narrowed the institutional curriculum to the Wahhabi-Salafi articulation. The post-1925 Saudi religious-educational apparatus has produced one of the world's most consequential institutional-religious-educational networks: the *Imam Muhammad ibn Saud Islamic University* in Riyadh, the *Islamic University of Medina* (established 1961 specifically to train international students in the Wahhabi-Salafi articulation), the King Saud University and other state-secular universities operating alongside the religious institutions. The post-1973 oil revenue funded one of the world's most extensive religious-educational-export programmes: Saudi-funded *madāris* across Pakistan, Afghanistan, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Balkans, sub-Saharan Africa, and increasingly across Western Muslim diasporic communities, propagating the specific Wahhabi-Salafi articulation of Islam at global scale.

The contemporary deformation operates at registers. The export of Wahhabi-Salafi religious education across the late twentieth century reconfigured the global Islamic educational landscape: South Asian *madāris* on the Saudi-Salafi model contesting the Barelvi-Sufi tradition; Bosnian Salafi networks emerging after the 1992–95 war; Indonesian Salafi networks contesting the NU establishment; West African Salafi networks contesting the Tijānī mass; the broader pattern [[The Hollowing of the Muslim Soul]] articulates at register. The Saudi internal educational apparatus has progressively reformed since the post-9/11 conditions and especially since the post-2017 MbS consolidation: the constraint of the *Muṭawwiʿīn* / religious-police presence in public-education enforcement, the textbook reforms reducing the most aggressive anti-Christian-and-anti-Jewish content, the expansion of music-and-arts curricula, the integration of female-and-male coeducation in selective university programmes. The brain-drain has depleted portions of the Saudi educated-creative elite, with Saudi-origin academic and creative apparatus operating across the Gulf-regional and Western diasporic locations. The Saudi STEM achievements (Saudi university research output relative to comparable economies, achievements in specific medical and engineering fields, the *KAUST* (King Abdullah University of Science and Technology, founded 2009) institutional development) operate alongside the broader institutional constraints.

The recovery direction is the institutional reactivation of the broader *madhhab*-and-*ṭarīqa*-and-*kalām* learning the pre-1925 Hijazi tradition operated within, against the contemporary Wahhabi-Salafi-narrowed apparatus; the integration of the broader Islamic philosophical-mystical inheritance into the religious-educational curriculum; the reform of the post-1973 educational-export apparatus toward articulation that the broader *umma*-wide tradition would support rather than the specific Wahhabi-Salafi articulation; the structural support of the surviving Hijazi traditional scholarly families and the broader integration with the *umma*-wide preservation (al-Azhar, the Maghrebi Sufi-Maliki networks, the Mauritanian *Maḥāḍir*, the Yemeni Bā ʿAlawī, the Indonesian NU). The deeper Harmonist articulation lives in [[Harmonic Pedagogy]] and [[The Future of Education]].

---

## 9. Science & Technology

Saudi Arabia carries the broader Islamic Golden Age scientific inheritance — al-Khwārizmī's algebra, al-Bīrūnī's mathematics-and-astronomy-and-geography, Ibn al-Haytham's optics, al-Rāzī's medicine, and the broader Islamic Golden Age apparatus that shaped the European Renaissance through the Toledo translation movement and the broader transmission. The contemporary Saudi scientific-technological position operates within the post-1973 oil-revenue funded institutional development: the *KAUST* graduate research institute, *King Saud University* and other state universities operating with significant research-output relative to comparable economies, the Saudi participation in the international space-and-research apparatus, the Saudi-Aramco technical-research apparatus operating at oil-petroleum frontier-research scale, the post-2017 Vision 2030 technology-and-AI development programme.

The deeper structural condition carries specific Saudi inflections. The Vision 2030 AI-and-technology programme operates with significant state investment (the *Saudi Data and Artificial Intelligence Authority*, the broader sovereign-AI-capacity development) alongside the broader US-and-Chinese strategic-technology apparatus integration. The *NEOM* technology-megaproject programme — the proposed Line city's design-and-implementation, the broader Vision 2030 technology-projection — operates with scale and prestige investment that exceeds standard project-deployment frameworks. The surveillance-technology deployment within the Saudi state-security apparatus operates at scale (Pegasus-and-other-spyware acquisitions documented post-Khashoggi, broader internal-surveillance integration) the broader Islamic ethical tradition's articulation on the *ʿawra* (the private domain the state has structural obligation to protect) would condemn. The recovery direction is the realignment of Saudi science-and-technology effort with what the Islamic substrate would direct: technology that serves cultivation rather than displacing it; AI systems disciplined by the recognition that powerful instruments require ethical cultivation proportional to their power; the refusal of the surveillance turn in technology deployment regardless of strategic alignment; the integration of *khalīfa* (stewardship) substrate with contemporary technological-development logic. The inheritance is structurally rich; the contemporary integration with state-security and Vision-2030-prestige apparatus carries specific constraints. [[The Telos of Technology]] and [[The Ontology of A.I.]] supply the systematic treatment.

---

## 10. Communication

Saudi Arabia's information environment carries features distinct from comparable cases. The Saudi state-aligned media apparatus — the *Saudi Press Agency*, *Al Arabiya* (the Saudi-funded pan-Arab broadcaster operating as Saudi-aligned counter-Al-Jazeera apparatus), the Saudi-owned international-media apparatus (the *Asharq Al-Awsat* newspaper, the *MBC* broadcasting group, the Saudi-positioned holdings across pan-Arab and increasingly global media platforms) — operates as integrated Saudi-positioning apparatus. The post-2018 Khashoggi-assassination international scrutiny constrained but did not fundamentally reorganise Saudi media-acquisition strategy across the Gulf-regional and broader pan-Arab apparatus.

The Saudi internet-restriction apparatus operates at the broader Gulf-regional level (content-filtering, particular constraint of political-and-religious dissent, post-2017 social-media surveillance integration with state-security apparatus). The Saudi sovereign-platform development operates at smaller scale than the comparable Iranian or Chinese cases; Saudi Arabia operates largely within the global US-and-Chinese platform apparatus with state-aligned content management. The post-2017 social-liberalisation programme has produced specific opening for entertainment-cultural production (Saudi-funded cinema, music, sports-event hosting) alongside continuing constraint on political-and-religious dissent.

**The speech-regulation architecture.** The *Basic Law of Governance* (1992) provides no constitutional speech-protection equivalent — Article 39 mandates that media *contribute to educating the nation and consolidating its unity* and prohibits *all that leads to discord*, with *Sharia* and the state's interpretation of it as the operative speech-regulation framework. The *Anti-Cybercrime Law* (2007), *Counter-Terrorism Law* (2014, expanded 2017), and *Public Decency Law* (2019) operate the codified architecture, with vague provisions on *disturbing public order*, *insulting the state*, *terrorism* construed broadly to include peaceful advocacy, and *immoral material* used against journalists, women's-rights activists, religious dissenters, and ordinary social-media users. Blasphemy and apostasy are capital offences under the Sharia framework as interpreted by the Saudi judiciary, with no codified protection comparable to constitutional speech doctrine elsewhere. The post-2017 reform period under *Mohammed bin Salman* has produced specific opening for entertainment-cultural production while *tightening* enforcement against political and religious speech — the assassination of *Jamal Khashoggi* in October 2018 in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul is the load-bearing extraterritorial case; the 34-year sentence handed to *Salma al-Shehab* in 2022 for tweets supporting women's rights, the 27-year sentence handed to *Mohammed al-Ghamdi* in 2023 for YouTube comments and tweets, and the long imprisonments of *Loujain al-Hathloul*, *Raif Badawi*, *Mohammed al-Qahtani*, and many others document the operational scale. The doctrinal absence of constitutional speech-protection is the structural truth; the lived speech experience is among the most constrained globally, with the *post-2017 reform* register producing entertainment-liberalisation alongside political-religious-speech-criminalisation rather than substituting one for the other.

The Saudi state has progressively integrated with the broader transnational financial-media-influence ecosystem at scale (the LIV Golf investment, the Newcastle United football-club acquisition, the broader sports-washing investment apparatus across global sports leagues, the Hollywood-and-entertainment investment apparatus). The cross-pillar integration with the financial-asset apparatus and the broader prestige-investment apparatus (treated in the Globalist Architecture section below) constitutes a specific contemporary Saudi inflection. The recovery direction is the disentanglement of sovereign-communication-infrastructure from state-control-of-the-information-environment; the recognition that genuine sovereignty in the communication pillar requires the infrastructure to operate within constitutional constraints honest enough that opposition speech remains possible; the constraint of the prestige-investment apparatus toward investments the substrate's deepest articulation would support rather than the spectacle-and-influence logic; the development of public-sphere conditions the broader Islamic substrate's articulation on *naṣīḥa* (sincere advice as religious-ethical obligation, including advice to rulers) would require. The structural conditions for the reform are absent under contemporary conditions; the substrate for the reform exists in the broader Islamic political-ethical tradition.

---

## 11. Culture

Arabia carries one of the world's most concentrated literary-cultural inheritances. The pre-Islamic Arabian poetic tradition — the *Muʿallaqāt* (the hanging-odes of Imruʾ al-Qays, Ṭarafa, Zuhayr, Labīd, ʿAntara, ʿAmr ibn Kulthūm, al-Ḥārith), the broader *qaṣīda* and *ghazal* traditions — operates as foundational poetic substrate the Qurʾan itself operates within and against. The Arabic language and its classical-poetic apparatus has been one of the most consequential linguistic-cultural inheritances any civilization has carried, with the Qurʾan operating as the highest articulation of the language for the broader Islamic tradition and the classical Arabic-poetic apparatus operating as continuous reference across centuries. The Arabian *bedouin*-cultural apparatus — the oral-narrative tradition, the integration of *karam* (generosity) as ethical-cultural ideal, the *sharaf* (honour) tradition operating with both ethical content and deformation potential — operated alongside the broader Islamic-cultural articulation.

The contemporary cultural deformation operates at registers the cultural-prestige surface of the post-2017 social-liberalisation programme obscures. The post-2017 cinema-and-music-and-sports apparatus has produced cultural production at scale (the Saudi Film Festival, the *MDLBEAST* music programming, the *Riyadh Season* and broader entertainment-events apparatus, the LIV Golf and Newcastle-United and broader sports-investment apparatus, the *NEOM* design-and-prestige programme), but the production operates within state-determined parameters and primarily reflects state-aligned cultural-prestige projection rather than the substrate of Arabian-and-broader-Islamic civilizational depth the elder tradition produced. The cultural-economic apparatus operates as integrated state-prestige-and-investment apparatus rather than as autonomous cultural-creative space. The Saudi literary-and-creative diasporic apparatus operates across the Gulf-regional and Western locations at scale, with Saudi-origin cultural producers operating outside the kingdom in many cases.

The contemporary erosion operates at registers. The pre-Wahhabi cultural-architectural-historical inheritance has been progressively demolished across the late-twentieth and twenty-first centuries (the Hijazi Ottoman-period architectural fabric across Mecca and Medina, the broader Arabian historical-architectural apparatus the development-priority logic has displaced). The integrated *bedouin*-cultural substrate operates at diminished scale under the rapid-urbanisation conditions. The constraint of cultural production on politically-and-religiously-sensitive topics persists despite the post-2017 social-liberalisation programme. The recovery direction is the institutional support of the cultural-transmission infrastructure at the depth the broader Arabian-and-Islamic tradition's own deepest articulation demands; the reform of the destruction-of-historical-architectural-fabric logic toward preservation-and-restoration discipline the broader Islamic architectural tradition's own articulation would support; the structural support of contemporary cultural work that operates at the depth the surviving Arabian poetic-literary tradition and the surviving Hijazi traditional-cultural lineages have demonstrated possible. The substrate exists in cultural memory and in surviving institutional fragments and in the surviving lineages.

---

## The Contemporary Diagnosis

Saudi Arabia exhibits, in concentrated form, the structural pathologies the broader Harmonist diagnosis of late modernity articulates at civilizational scale, alongside specific Saudi inflections that no other major civilization shares. The cultural-prestige surface — the *Khādim al-Ḥaramayn* title, the post-2017 social-liberalisation programme, the Vision 2030 development-projection apparatus, the global-prestige-investment programme — has insulated Saudi Arabia from the diagnostic register the underlying conditions warrant. Saudi Arabia is one of the most consequential late-modernity cases in the Islamic world: the country that holds custodianship of the two cities the broader *umma* regards as inheritance is the country in which the specific Wahhabi-Salafi articulation has captured the religious-institutional apparatus and exported it globally at scale, and the contemporary post-2017 state apparatus has paired internal-political consolidation with social-liberalisation operating as cosmetic transformation against the structural conditions of authoritarian rule.

The Saudi-specific symptoms are sharp. The structural concentration of authority under MbS, with the surrounding-elite reorganisation through the Ritz-Carlton detentions, the constraint of independent civil society, the detention apparatus operating against domestic critics, and the Khashoggi assassination as the most public expression of the structural condition. The Yemen-war humanitarian catastrophe operating as the Saudi-coalition's most consequential military operation. The metabolic-disease prevalence at among the world's highest rates, reflecting the rapid transition from traditional dietary substrate to industrialised processed-food consumption. The *kafāla* migrant-labour apparatus producing structural arrangements between the Saudi citizen population and the migrant-worker population (constituting the majority of the kingdom's workforce) the broader Islamic-ethical tradition would condemn. The structural environmental deformation — groundwater depletion, urbanisation in geographically constrained territory, carbon-emissions intensity. The pre-Wahhabi Hijazi cosmopolitan-Islamic-cultural inheritance progressively demolished across the post-1925 period and continuing into the contemporary mega-construction logic.

The Saudi-specific inflections are four. The *structural-religious custodianship* of the two cities operating as legitimation that exceeds any specific Saudi-political claim — and the question of whether the contemporary Saudi state's relation to that custodianship is honouring or appropriating the obligation is the most consequential structural question the Saudi case poses. The *Wahhabi-Salafi articulation as state-religious-institutional apparatus* — a specific eighteenth-century reformist movement institutionalised as the religious-educational apparatus of the state, exported globally across the late twentieth century at scale, and constraining the broader Islamic civilizational-religious tradition's range of positions both within the kingdom and across the broader *umma*. The *oil-petrodollar-architectural integration* with the US-led financial-strategic system since 1945 — the Saudi state operating as one of the most consequential single players in the post-WWII US-dollar-reserve system and the post-1973 petrodollar architecture, with the specific structural-rent-extraction the configuration enables. The *post-2017 MbS-era reconfiguration* — paired internal-authoritarian-consolidation with social-liberalisation and strategic-realignment, with the 2023 Iran-Saudi normalisation and the reported 2024 expiration of the formal US-Saudi security-oil agreement signalling structural realignment the trajectory of which remains uncertain.

Saudi Arabia cannot solve its structural crises through the standard Western-progressive menu (more Western-aligned-secularisation, more democratic-liberalisation), because the Saudi state-religious-apparatus articulation has refused that menu at the level of foundational political-religious settlement. It cannot solve them through the contemporary Wahhabi-Salafi articulation either, because that articulation operates as the specific eighteenth-century reformist apparatus the broader Islamic civilizational tradition would refuse as the institutional voice claiming to be the tradition. The recovery must operate at the level of the structural pathologies themselves, which requires a framework neither Western-progressive nor Wahhabi-Salafi.

---

## Saudi Arabia within the Globalist Architecture

The country-specific symptoms diagnosed above operate within a transnational ecosystem the canonical [[The Globalist Elite]] and [[The Financial Architecture]] articles treat at systematic register. Saudi Arabia's specific position within that ecosystem differs from most other major cases: Saudi Arabia operates as one of the most consequential single participants in the post-WWII US-dollar-petroleum architecture, with the structural-rent-extraction the configuration enables, while simultaneously pursuing partial integration with the alternative-architectural apparatus being built across non-Western states.

**The 1945 USS Quincy settlement and the petrodollar architecture.** The February 1945 meeting between Franklin Roosevelt and King Abdulaziz aboard the USS *Quincy* in the Suez Canal — and the broader US-Saudi strategic settlement that emerged from it — established Saudi Arabia as central participant in the post-WWII US-led security-and-financial architecture. The settlement: US security guarantee for the Saudi state in exchange for Saudi oil-supply reliability and dollar-denominated pricing of oil exports. The 1973–74 oil-pricing reorganisation following the Yom Kippur War and the OPEC oil embargo produced the *petrodollar* architecture as fully-articulated structural arrangement: Saudi Arabia and the broader OPEC apparatus priced oil exclusively in US dollars, accumulated the dollar surplus in US Treasury securities and broader US dollar-denominated assets, and the US dollar gained the structural-demand foundation sustaining its global-reserve-currency status through the broader post-Bretton-Woods period. The Saudi state — through *SAMA* (the Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority, renamed *Saudi Central Bank* in 2020) and the Public Investment Fund — has held US dollar-denominated assets at among the world's largest scales, with the structural integration into the broader US Treasury-and-asset-management ecosystem. The 50-year formal agreement that organised portions of this architecture is reported to have lapsed in June 2024 without formal renewal under conditions the Saudi state has not publicly clarified — signalling structural realignment in process though not yet structurally fundamental.

**The asset-management and global-prestige investment apparatus.** Saudi participation in the global financial-asset apparatus operates at multiple registers. The Public Investment Fund operates as sovereign-wealth apparatus with major holdings across BlackRock-and-Vanguard-and-State-Street asset-management apparatus, with strategic positions in Uber, Lucid Motors, Newcastle United football club, LIV Golf, Hollywood entertainment apparatus, gaming-industry holdings (the broader portfolio operating as both financial-return and prestige-and-influence-projection apparatus). The Saudi participation in the *World Economic Forum* (the kingdom hosts its own *Future Investment Initiative* — the "Davos in the Desert" — annually, with state-level integration with the broader WEF apparatus), the Saudi presence in the broader transnational coordination apparatus, and the post-2017 MbS-era acceleration of global prestige-investment have produced specific Saudi integration with the broader transnational financial-influence ecosystem [[The Globalist Elite]] articulates.

**The BRICS-and-multipolar partial integration.** Saudi Arabia accepted invitation to BRICS+ in August 2023 (with full membership formalisation contested through subsequent stages), reflecting the post-2018 strategic-realignment trajectory the Saudi state has progressively pursued. The 2023 China-mediated Iran-Saudi normalisation — the March 2023 Beijing-announced restoration of diplomatic relations between Riyadh and Tehran after seven years of severed relations — represents one of the most consequential structural-realignment events in the post-WWII Middle Eastern security architecture, mediated by Beijing rather than Washington and signalling Saudi acceptance of a regional security configuration distinct from the US-led architecture. The Saudi integration with the broader Russia-and-China financial-strategic apparatus operates at growing scale (energy-sector cooperation with both, *OPEC+* coordination with Russia, *Belt and Road* integration with Chinese investment, growing ruble-and-yuan-denominated trade-and-investment integration). The Saudi position carries the simultaneity of US-dollar-petroleum-architectural integration (continuing in attenuated form) and BRICS-multipolar integration (growing); the structural trajectory of the simultaneous integration remains contested.

**The Israel-Saudi normalisation track.** The pre-October-7-2023 Saudi-Israeli normalisation track, advanced through the broader *Abraham Accords* framework and through US-mediated specific Saudi-Israeli arrangements, was constrained by the post-October-7 conditions (the Gaza war's structural transformation of Saudi domestic-and-regional politics, the broader Arab public opposition to overt normalisation under continuing Israeli operations). The track has been partially reactivated under structurally-modified conditions through 2024–2025 but remains incomplete. The Saudi position carries the structural tension between strategic-alignment-with-US-and-Israel and the religious-political-symbolic obligations the *Khādim al-Ḥaramayn* title encodes for the broader Muslim world.

The systematic treatment of these mechanisms lives in [[The Globalist Elite]] and [[The Financial Architecture]]; what Saudi Arabia contributes to the ecosystem-level analysis is the demonstration that the architecture operates through specific late-twentieth-century settlements (the 1945 USS Quincy, the 1973 petrodollar reorganisation) the contemporary realignment is progressively but incompletely renegotiating. The recovery direction at the structural level requires the disentanglement of Saudi sovereignty from both the US-dollar-petroleum-architectural integration and the contemporary partial BRICS-multipolar integration toward articulation the substrate's deepest articulation would direct — the Islamic juridical tradition's own articulation on the conditions of legitimate commerce and legitimate strategic-alliance, the *Khādim al-Ḥaramayn* title's structural obligation to operate as servant of the broader *umma* rather than as principal participant in any specific transnational-elite ecosystem.

---

## The Recovery Path

What Harmonism offers Saudi Arabia is the explicit doctrinal framework within which the Arabian substrate becomes legible as a living cosmology rather than as scattered cultural-religious remainders captured by the specific Wahhabi-Salafi articulation. The framework is not foreign; it is the articulation of what Arabia indigenously carries and what the broader *umma*-wide tradition has continuously transmitted across the regions the Saudi-Wahhabi articulation has progressively contested.

The integrations available from Saudi Arabia's current position are specific. The **explicit recognition that the Wahhabi-Salafi articulation is one specific eighteenth-century reformist movement rather than Islam itself**, with the broader Islamic civilizational-religious tradition's range of positions available as alternative-and-complementary articulations the broader inheritance carries: Sunni-Sufi-Maliki integration as in Morocco and the Maghreb; Hanbali-Sufi integration as in al-Jīlānī's Qādiriyya; the Mauritanian *Maḥāḍir* integration of *fiqh*-*taṣawwuf*-Arabic-letters; the Yemeni Bā ʿAlawī integration; the Indonesian NU integration; the Iranian Shia esoteric-philosophical-cultivation integration. The Wahhabi-Salafi articulation is approximately three centuries old; the broader Islamic civilizational tradition is fourteen centuries old; the contemporary state-religious-apparatus claim that the former is the authentic articulation of the latter is a specific institutional voice the broader tradition does not authorise. The **disentanglement of structural-religious custodianship of the two cities from contemporary Wahhabi-Salafi institutional-doctrinal apparatus** — the recognition that *Khādim al-Ḥaramayn* obligations operate at register the broader *umma*-wide tradition has continuously held, distinct from the contemporary Saudi-state articulation of who counts as authentic Muslim and whose practice is authentic. The **integration of the broader Islamic contemplative-jurisprudential tradition with the Saudi religious-institutional apparatus** — the reactivation of Sufi-and-Sunni-and-Shia range of positions across the contemporary Saudi religious-and-educational apparatus against the institutional dominance of the Wahhabi-Salafi articulation. The **cross-cartographic verification through Harmonism's articulation** that the territory the Sufi tradition names is the same territory the Indian, Chinese, Russian, Andean, and broader Greek-Abrahamic-contemplative traditions reach through different vocabularies, strengthening the Arabian inheritance against the contemporary institutional claim that the Sufi tradition is foreign to Islam.

Beyond the substrate-level integrations, four sovereignty recoveries name what the late-modern deformations require, operating against the specific Saudi inflection.

**Financial sovereignty** Saudi Arabia has accumulated at scale through oil-revenue and petrodollar-architectural integration, although the accumulation operates within structural-rent-extraction the broader Islamic-economic tradition would condemn. The recovery direction is the disciplining of the financial apparatus by the Islamic-ethical substrate the broader Islamic juridical tradition articulates: the deepening of Islamic-finance apparatus toward genuine *ribā*-and-*gharar*-avoidance rather than legal-structural workaround; the disciplining of the Public Investment Fund's deployment toward investments serving the underlying civilizational *Dharma* and the broader *umma*'s welfare rather than the prestige-and-spectacle logic; the reform of *kafāla* apparatus as financial-structural condition the broader Islamic-economic apparatus would condemn; the development of post-petrodollar financial-architectural integration with BRICS-multipolar apparatus on terms the substrate's deepest articulation would support rather than the substitution of one transnational-elite-ecosystem-integration for another. The substrate carries the apparatus; the institutional realisation requires the disentanglement.

**Defense sovereignty** Saudi Arabia has built through structural integration with the US security architecture across roughly eight decades. The recovery direction is the subordination of strategic-sovereign capacity to the underlying civilizational *Dharma* the Islamic just-war tradition articulates: defense as last resort disciplined by ethical cultivation; the completion of the Yemen war on terms recognising the structural costs of continuation and the humanitarian responsibility for what has been done; the rebuilding of a defense culture grounded in the recognition that Saudi sovereignty is for the sake of *Khādim al-Ḥaramayn* obligations rather than for regional-influence-projection; the disentanglement from structural dependence on the US security architecture toward genuine strategic-sovereign capacity disciplined by the Islamic-ethical substrate; the constraint of the MIC's domestic-political-economic weight.

**Technological sovereignty** Saudi Arabia is building through Vision 2030 investment and the broader sovereign-AI-and-technology-development programme. The recovery direction is the realignment of Saudi technology-and-AI development with what the substrate's most disciplined articulation would direct: technology that serves cultivation rather than displacing it; AI systems disciplined by the Islamic-philosophical recognition that powerful instruments require ethical cultivation proportional to their power; the refusal of the surveillance turn in technology deployment regardless of strategic alignment; the integration of *khalīfa* stewardship substrate with contemporary technological-development logic.

**Communicative sovereignty** Saudi Arabia operates within the broader global US-and-Chinese platform apparatus with state-aligned content management and significant prestige-acquisition of global media and entertainment apparatus. The recovery direction is the disentanglement of sovereign-communication-infrastructure from state-control-of-the-information-environment; the constraint of the prestige-investment apparatus toward investments the substrate's deepest articulation would support; the development of public-sphere conditions the broader Islamic substrate's articulation on *naṣīḥa* (sincere advice as religious-ethical obligation, including advice to rulers) would require.

Across all of these, the **substrate-recovery through reactivation of the pre-Wahhabi Hijazi cosmopolitan-Islamic tradition** and the **broader *umma*-wide integration** alongside the Saudi-internal institutional reform. The Hijaz before 1925 carried the integrated Islamic learning the broader *umma* converged on; the surviving fragments of that tradition (the al-Mālikī family scholarly lineage and broader Hijazi traditional scholarly families; the Bā ʿAlawī networks operating from Yemen across the global diaspora; the broader Sunni-Sufi tradition's continuing transmission across the regions the Wahhabi-Salafi articulation has not captured) carry the substrate the contemporary Saudi religious-institutional apparatus has constrained. The recovery requires the structural opening of contemporary Saudi religious-educational space to the broader *umma*-wide range of positions, the disentanglement of contemporary Saudi state authority from the specific Wahhabi-doctrinal apparatus, and the reactivation of the substrate the 1925 conquest of the Hijaz progressively suppressed but did not eliminate. [[The Guru and the Guide]] articulates the structural endpoint: cultivation forms are vehicles, and the highest purpose of integrated cultivation is the production of realised practitioners who stand on the direct ground rather than perpetual adherents to the form. The Saudi recovery includes the permission for the substrate to do what the substrate was always structured to do — produce the realised human beings in whom *tawḥīd-taqwā-iḥsān* has become operative fact rather than institutional-conformity surface.

None of these requires Saudi Arabia to abandon its civilizational distinctiveness or the *Khādim al-Ḥaramayn* obligations the structural-religious custodianship encodes. All of them require the contemporary Saudi state to refuse the specific eighteenth-century reformist articulation the 1744 pact institutionalised, toward the broader Islamic civilizational tradition's range of positions the contemporary state apparatus has constrained. The first step is the articulation. Harmonism provides the vocabulary in which the articulation becomes speakable.

---

## Closing

Saudi Arabia and Harmonism converge because both articulate the same structure through different registers. Arabia names *tawḥīd* what Harmonism names Logos at the cosmic-order register; *taqwā* and *iḥsān* what Harmonism articulates as Dharma at the human-conduct register; the integrated *Sharīʿa-Ṭarīqa-Ḥaqīqa* cascade what the broader cartographies articulate through different vocabularies but reach as the same territory; the *fiṭra* what Harmonism articulates as the human being's structural orientation toward alignment; the *khalīfa* obligation what Harmonism articulates as the human responsibility within the Architecture. The translation between the vocabularies is possible because the territory is the same.

Every civilization is an implicit metaphysics. The question is whether the implicit metaphysics converges with what Harmonism articulates explicitly, where it converges, where it diverges, and what the recovery path looks like from within the civilization's specific substrate. Saudi Arabia carries the structural-religious custodianship of the two cities the broader *umma* regards as inheritance, the specific eighteenth-century Wahhabi-Salafi reformist articulation that has captured the religious-institutional apparatus across three centuries and been exported globally across the late twentieth century, the broader Islamic civilizational tradition's range of positions the contemporary state apparatus has constrained but not eliminated, the surviving Hijazi traditional scholarly families and the broader Sunni-Sufi inheritance the pre-1925 Arabian substrate carried, and the post-1973 oil-revenue and post-2017 MbS-era reorganisation that has paired internal-authoritarian-consolidation with social-liberalisation under conditions of structural realignment with the broader transnational-multipolar architecture. The recovery is structurally possible. The substrate is still present. The vocabulary in which the work becomes speakable is available now. The disentanglement of contemporary Saudi state authority from the specific Wahhabi-Salafi articulation and the reactivation of the broader Islamic civilizational tradition's range of positions is the structural condition of the recovery; the disentanglement is the work the substrate's own deepest articulation has been waiting for someone to undertake. This is what *Bilād al-Ḥaramayn* at its proper register has always pointed toward.

---

*See also: [[Architecture of Harmony]], [[Harmonic Realism]], [[Wheel of Harmony]], [[Religion and Harmonism]], [[Harmonism and the Traditions]], [[The Five Cartographies of the Soul]], [[The Sufi Cartography of the Soul]], [[The Hollowing of the Muslim Soul]], [[Tawhid and the Architecture of the One]], [[The Guru and the Guide]], [[Harmonic Pedagogy]], [[The Future of Education]], [[The Spiritual Crisis]], [[The Hollowing of the West]], [[Materialism and Harmonism]], [[Liberalism and Harmonism]], [[The Redefinition of the Human Person]], [[The Globalist Elite]], [[The Financial Architecture]], [[The Telos of Technology]], [[The Ontology of A.I.]], [[Iran and Harmonism]], [[Applied Harmonism]]*
